Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dx.doi.org/10.14279/depositonce-15938
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Main Title: Radical artifactualism
Author(s): Oliveira, Guilherme Sanches de
Type: Article
URI: https://depositonce.tu-berlin.de/handle/11303/17159
http://dx.doi.org/10.14279/depositonce-15938
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Abstract: A powerful idea put forward in the recent philosophy of science literature is that scientific models are best understood as instruments, tools or, more generally, artifacts. This idea has thus far been developed in combination with the more traditional representational approach: accordingly, current artifactualist accounts treat models as representational tools. But artifactualism and representationalism are independent views, and adopting one does not require acceptance of the other. This paper argues that a leaner version of artifactualism, free of representationalist assumptions, is both desirable and viable. Taking seriously the idea that models are artifacts can help us philosophically to make sense of how and why scientific modeling works even without reference to representation.
Subject(s): scientific modeling
representation
tool use
material engagement
pragmatism
Issue Date: 2-Jun-2022
Date Available: 27-Jun-2022
Language Code: en
DDC Class: 150 Psychologie
Sponsor/Funder: TU Berlin, Open-Access-Mittel – 2022
Journal Title: European Journal for Philosophy of Science
Publisher: Springer Nature
Volume: 12
Article Number: 36
Publisher DOI: 10.1007/s13194-022-00462-0
EISSN: 1879-4920
ISSN: 1879-4912
TU Affiliation(s): Fak. 5 Verkehrs- und Maschinensysteme » Inst. Psychologie und Arbeitswissenschaft » FG Biopsychologie und Neuroergonomie
Appears in Collections:Technische Universität Berlin » Publications

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